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DEEP SEA MANGANESE NODULES: FROM
SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENON TO WORLD RESOURCE
DAVID B. BROOKS*

Ten years ago the presence of manganese-bearing nodules on the
floor of the deep ocean basins was known to but a few oceanographers. Today, their presence is known not only to geologists, but to
mining men, to international lawyers, and-through numerous
articles in popular news media-to many in the general public. This
burst of attention comes with good reason, for what was once a
scientific curiosity is being heralded as a potential source of manganese, nickel, copper, and other metals for the world's industries.
But the fact that a metal exists, even in very sizable quantities, is
by no means sufficient to make it a resource in the sense it can be
used commercially. Ocean water is a reservoir of all the metals occurring on earth, and one that is freely available to any coastal
nation, yet except for magnesium, no primary metal is commercially
recovered from sea water. Despite years of experimentation and
hope, the oceans remain almost as intractable as they were to the
alchemist. The distance from scientific phenomenon to world resource is indeed large.
Clearly, then, the first thing to ask about deep sea manganese
nodules is whether there are any grounds for thinking that they
might in the foreseeable future make the transition from phenomenon to resource. Anticipating a qualified but affirmative answer to
this question, two other general questions follow: (1) what are the
characteristics of deep sea mining likely to be, and (2) what sorts of
institutional arrangements will such an operation need in order to
operate equitably, efficiently, and without conflict? The latter two
questions are interrelated, but they are distinguishable. Whereas one
involves a sort of best guess about the kind of mining operation that
is likely to emerge regardless of the international regime, the other
involves the choice among those regimes and the influence that each
may bear on the efficiency of production and the distribution of
returns.
Of course, as stated, the three questions have technologic, economic, and political dimensions. My own limitations, even more than
* Chief, Division of Mineral Economics, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the
Interior, Washington, D.C. This paper was prepared while the author was on the faculty of Berea College, Berea, Kentucky.
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those of time, preclude a discussion of all of them. In order to
emphasize the economic dimension, let me delimit the questions as
follows: Are deep sea manganese nodules likely to become a commercial resource? What economic characteristics are deep sea
mining ventures likely to exhibit? What institutional arrangements
are most likely to promote the economic efficiency of deep sea mining? These three questions correspond to the three main sections of
this paper and are taken up in order.
Before proceeding to the questions, an additional prefatory comment is called for. Consideration of the second and third questions
would be vital today even if there were only a low probability that
the deep sea manganese would ever be exploited. I cannot agree
with those who say that international law will not and should not
be developed until a conflict situation has arisen, that is, until mining
has actually begun. It is inconceivable to me that we cannot design
institutions that will serve to guide development rather than to
follow it. By waiting we may just be abstaining from choice in
favor of letting the circumstances of the first few mining ventures
determine the results. More seriously, we may be promoting conflict in a world already too burdened with it.
I
DEEP SEA MANGANESE NODULES AS A WORLD RESOURCE

What is a "Resource"?
There is no entirely satisfactory definition of the word resource.
It does not, on the one hand, imply that a material must be producible at a profit today using present technology, nor does it, on the
other hand, encompass all possible sources regardless of how lean or
how deep in the earth. As generally understood, the term resources
falls between these two extremes; it refers to a material that may
someday be exploited given moderate changes in economic condition
and/or reasonably expectable technologic advances.'
For our purposes it is convenient to propose a somewhat sharper
definition. Let us say that a resource is a material that may or may
not be exploitable with today's technology and at today's prices, but
A.

1. Known sources of some metal that are producible at a profit today are called its
reserves whereas all potentially recoverable sources of that metal constitute its resource
base. This terminology, along with the broad use of the term resources, follows that
proposed by Bruce C. Netschert and Hans H. Landsberg in The Future Supply of the
Major Metals 3 (1961).
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that is sufficiently close to exploitability that it exerts some influence
on price. This added criterion is an attempt to be more specific about
the time dimension of the future economic conditions or technologic
advances that can make the material exploitable. The effect on
price may be direct, as when prices of current sources are forced
downward, or it may be indirect, as when business firms begin to
consider the new resource in their decision making. Thus, atomic
energy had a direct effect on fossil fuel prices long before it became
commercial, and oil shale is currently having an indirect effect on the
same market.2 On the other hand, sea water (except for magnesium) and granite are not yet resources; exploitability is too
remote.
It is my contention that deep sea manganese nodules are a resource in this sense of having a direct, or more likely an indirect,
influence on price, and, conversely, that other alternative manganese-bearing materials are not resources. What is the evidence for
such a position? In order to answer, we must investigate two things:
the demand for manganese, including both present uses and possible
substitutes, and the supply of managanese, including both current
sources and potential alternative sources (of which deep sea nodules
are only one). Each limb of manganese economics has numerous ramifications, but they must be treated in very summary fashion here.'
B.

Manganese Demand
Consider demand first. The main use of manganese, accounting
for some ninety-five per cent of its consumption, is as an additive
metal in steelmaking. It serves primarily to reduce a kind of brittleless called hot shortness that is caused by excess sulfur. Common
carbon steel contains about one half of one per cent manganese. Substitutes can be found for each of the functions manganese serves in
2. The active market and rising prices for privately held parcels of oil shale land
in Colorado provide evidence of this indirect effect. As a matter of fact, despite their
completely different geology and geography, the economic similarities between deep sea
manganese and oil shale are marked. Both have been known for some time but neither
has been successfully exploited; deposits of each can be delineated relatively easily so
that greater uncertainty attaches to recovery methods than to the resources; and neither
is likely to attract any but the largest firms. These common economic characteristics,
which will be discussed below for the nodules, suggest that there may be similarities in
the public policies applicable to oil shale and to deep sea manganese.
3. For a more complete discussion of these aspects of manganese economics, see D.
Brooks, Low-Grade and Nonconventional Sources of Managanese (1966). This book
represents a pilot study designed to see whether it was possible to clarify the concept
of resources for the case of a single mineral commodity.
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steel, but no other material does so much yet costs so little. Whereas manganese seldom costs more than four cents per pound, possible
substitutes, such as the rare-earth metals and vanadium, cost upwards of one dollar per pound. Though it is possible that economies
in use will cause the consumption of manganese per ton of steel to
decline in the future, all projections indicate a continuing rise in the
total demand for manganese because of growth in steel production
around the world. Demand, then, looks favorable to the prospects
of deep sea mining or of other alternative manganese resources.
C.

ManganeseSupply: CurrentSources
Turning to the supply side, however, we find a different picture.
Current sources of supply, i.e., existing mines, appear quite adequate. Modern manganese mines contain vast quantities of highgrade, low-cost reserves; They can continue to produce at high rates
for many years to come. In fact, the newer mines are really little
more than earth-moving operations in which enormous beds of
near-surface manganese ore are recovered by bulldozers and, after
some concentration, are moved directly to a port. True, some of
these mines have cost as much as 100 million dollars to bring into
production, but they contain so much ore that it is doubtful whether
the investment per ton of reserve is any higher than it was in the
past. In sum, while the demand for manganese is strong, there is no
present need to turn away from current sources of supply unless and
until one of the alternative sources turns out to be as cheap as, or
cheaper than, conventional mines.
D.

ManganeseSupply: Alternative Source
With these projections in mind, we are in a position to consider
alternative sources. Generally speaking, there are two types of alternative sources for any mineral commodity. First, there are lowgrade sources that are similar to deposits being mined today but in
which the metal is less concentrated. Second, there are nonconventional sources from which metal has not in the past been commercially recovered. Low-grade sources of manganese in this country
include deposits in Maine, South Dakota, Arizona, and Minnesota.
There are also at least two nonconventional sources: manganesebearing slags produced as a waste product during steelmaking, and
the deep sea nodules.
At the risk of some oversimplification, the prospects for sec-
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ondary recovery from slags and for mining low-grade deposits will
be dismissed with just a few sentences. The possibility of secondary
recovery arises because the open-hearth process of steelmaking is so
inefficient in its use of manganese that slags may contain more than
ten per cent manganese. Unfortunately, despite the fact that this
source is found right at steel plants, the silicate metallurgy of a
slag requires special refining procedures that significantly raise the
costs of recovery. Moreover, the basic oxygen converter, to which
steel makers are rapidly switching, is far more efficient in its use of
manganese, and B-O-F slags rarely contain more than five per cent
manganese. Much the same conclusion applies to the low-grade deposits. While a small manganese mining industry has existed in this
country from time to time, largely as a creature of artificially high
prices during war time or stockpiling programs, none of the lowgrade deposits has ever produced on a commercial basis. In fact,
cost of production data, based on many years of experimentation,
are similar for the two sources. Using the cheapest of the tested
processes, and allowing for further technologic progress, it would
cost the United States about one dollar extra per ton of steel (an
increase of more than one per cent) to turn either to domestic deposits or to slags for our manganese.' Thus, the cost of using strictly
domestic sources of manganese would turn out to be a significant
cost to the economy. Though a considerable sum was spent by the
government to investigate slags and low-grade deposits, it was not
because of any feared resource shortage, but from the security problem posed by our dependence on foreign manganese mines. For a
number of reasons, the security problem carries less weight today.
Thus an alternative source must prove itself commercially or not at
all. In short, neither the low-grade deposits nor the slags appear to
be resources in the sense defined above: their effect on manganese
prices or on decision-making by manganese firms is nil.
What about deep sea nodules, then? Are they an alternative
whose costs of production are close enough to high-grade onshore
reserves that they can be considered as a manganese resource? In
contrast to the situation just described, there are grounds for being
less skeptical.
For one thing, the nodules are attracting considerable attention
from industry, which was never true of the slags or low-grade
deposits. Quite a number of American firms have already invested
4.. Id. at 63-92, 111-13.
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funds in research on the geology of the nodules and a few on pos-

sible mining techniques; others are studying processing techniques.
Within the past year the existence of a "smooth, black pavement"
of nodules on the Blake Terrace off the southeastern United States
has been reported. Aluminaut, a deep-diving submarine, rode on its

wheels along the deposits and recovered samples that were said to

be better than the minimum commercial grade for manganese ore. 5

Other relatively high-grade nodules were recently discovered on the
continental shelf only fifty miles northwest of Vancouver, British
Columbia. 6 Another area of research suggests that separation of
the various metallic constituents of the nodules may not be as difficult

as was once supposed. Studies by Furstenau, for example, give
grounds for hope that relatively simple processes may make a multiproduct operation feasible. 7
Of course, few of the firms supporting research on the nodules
are really potential deep sea miners, but this is not the point. Deep
sea manganese is beginning to figure into their decision making.
Moreover, firms in other countries, notably Japan, Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, are conducting similar
studies.
I would also maintain that the very fact that conflicting opinions
are expressed about the value of deep sea nodules indicates that they
must be taken seriously. If someone suggested mining the moon, it
is doubtful that anyone would respond with figures on the adequacy
of conventional reserves. Such responses, which abound for deep sea
nodules, are generated only for reasonably possible alternative
sources. Almost from the original publication of engineering cost
estimates by John Mero in 1959, the feasibility of deep sea mining
has been a matter of controversy. 8 While the quality and quantity of
metalliferrous material in deep sea nodules is enough to make any
landlubber-miner green with envy, simple comparisons neglect the
5. 167 Engineering and Mining Journal 156 (1966).
6. 19 Mining Engineering 20 (1967).
7. D. Furstenau, A. Herring, and M. Hoover, Leaching Manganese Nodules
from the Ocean Floor; paper presented to 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers (AIME), Los Angeles, Calif.
See also: 166 Engineering and Mining Journal 112 (April 1965).
8. John L. Mero's work and projections are most fully presented in his book, The
Mineral Resources of the Sea (1965). For a more recent "progress report" by Mero,
see: The Future of Mining the Sea, Oceanology International, pp. 73-78 (October 1966).
Two of the best statements that question the prospects for deep sea manganese are as
follows: C. Ensign, Jr., Economic Barriers Delay Underseas Mining, Mining Engineering 59 (Sept. 1966), and T. Walthier, paper presented at the 1967 Annual
Meeting of the AIME, Los Angeles, Calif.
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many problems that must be overcome before production is technologically, to say nothing of economically, feasible. Depth of overlying water of course tops the list. Despite their high grade in many
places-they run up to fifty per cent manganese, plus several per
cent copper, cobalt, and nickel-the richest nodules tend to occur in
the deepest water. There is no proven technique for recovering
large quantities of material from such depths. We have had only
limited experience with hydraulic dredging, the most commonly suggested technique, and still less with the thousands of feet of hose
and problems of postioning that full-scale mining would entail. Nor,
even given the studies noted above, is the technology available to
cope with the fine grain size and intimate mixture of metals within a
nodule.
Despite all of these qualifications, investigation of as much cost information as I could obtain led me to conclude that deep sea manganese nodules are the only potential resource that might be exploited in the near-to-middle-term future, and that to a considerable
extent they already influence business decisions. This does not mean
that recovery of manganese from the oceans is today competitive
with recovery from high-grade ore deposits of the conventional
type. Until deep sea mining is actually attempted, the question of
competitive standing must remain unresolved. However, it does
mean that research on the possible exploitation of deep sea nodules
has gone far enough to make them the lowest cost alternative manganese resource of any size, and hence far enough to put a firm
ceiling on the long-run price of manganese-and perhaps of cobalt
and nickel as well. The price cannot rise higher than the cost of production of the nodules. Indeed, future prices could well be lower
than today's prices if deep sea mining becomes a reality.
II
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEEP SEA MINING

The second of our three questions asks about the economic characteristics of an ongoing deep sea mining industry. While we cannot
pretend to clairvoyance, enough is known about the problems and
the opportunities to derive some tentative but important conclusions. Let us consider first those aspects related to a single operation, and then those that will become important when competition
develops for deep sea sources of supply.
9. D. Brooks, tupra note 3, at 93-108, 120-22.
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The Deep Sea Mining Firm

So far as each individual mining venture is concerned, the foremost consideration is the high initial investment. Figures ranging
from 30 to 300 million dollars have been suggested as the amount
necessary to bring a deep sea mining operation, plus associated onshore processing facilities, into production. The appropriate figure
is probably in the neighborhood of 100 million dollars.' Certainly
this is high, but neglecting any risk premium, the large volume of
material that would be available to a single ship means that the
investment per ton of reserves is no greater than that for an onshore
mine. Moreover, it does not appear that investment cost is very
sensitive to scale; a 2,000 ton per day operation is not much cheaper
than one designed for 5,000 to 10,000 tons per day. In fact, indications are that investment per daily ton is still declining at 10,000
tons per day."
In partial compensation for the high initial investment, a deep
sea mining operation should entail relatively low operating costs.
Indeed, given the initial investment and the risk, a mining system will
have to promise low operating costs if it is even to be considered.
Again, published estimates are highly controversial, but two factors
stand out. First, unit operating costs at all stages of production go
down with increases in output. For example, the cost per ton of
moving solids through a hose, as from the ocean bottom to a ship,
decreases sharply over considerable ranges of throughput. Second,
unit operating costs for the more likely recovery systems increase
only slowly with depth. Mero has estimated that direct mining costs
for a hydraulic dredge will range from about two dollars and twentyfive cents per ton in 1,000 feet of water to four dollars and twentyfive cents per ton in 15,000 feet.' 2
The twin factors of high investment cost and low operating cost
suggest strongly that each deep sea mining venture will have to be
relatively large in scale. Only at high rates of production can such
investments be amortized in an acceptable length of time. Typical
rates will almost surely not be less than 2,000 tons of nodules per
day, and they could be 10,000 tons per day. Some 20 to 50 per cent
10. Id. at 99 and references cited there.
11. Based on data given by J. Mero, supra note 8, at 268-70.
12. Id. at 290. The assumed production rate is about 4,000 tons per day. See also:
H. Hess, The Ocean: Mining's Newest Frontier, 166 Engineering and Mining Journal 95 (August 1965).
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of this tonnage will be recoverable metal, which places each deep
sea mining operation at the scale of the largest onshore mines.
Under these conditions it is impossible to ignore the effect of
scale on the prices of the outputs. Estimates based on current consumption rates in the United States indicate that a ship with an output of even 500 tons per day would cause the price of cobalt to fall
and that at rates of 2,000 to 5,000 tons per day the prices of nickel
and manganese would also have to fall in order to clear the market.'"
Without going into detail, the implication is that gross revenue will
be considerably less than if current prices could be assumed to remain constant after deep sea mining begins. Of course, the price
effect of any one deep sea mining venture would diminish over time
as consumption rates increased; on the other hand, pressure on
prices would increase if this one venture proved successful and competitors entered the field.
To some extent the potential price effect may moderate the tendency to build large-scale mining systems. However, it is less likely
to moderate a tendency to use fully whatever capacity is available.
Near-capacity rates of production are typical of systems characterized by high investment and low operating costs, particularly if
unit operating costs continue to decline over most of the range up to
full capacity. The object is to recover more of the investment in any
time period by taking advantage of the low cost of additional units
of output. Such action can be carried so far that markets are totally
disrupted and the resource is quite incompletely recovered. Of
course, profits are apt to be minimal under these conditions, but as
Christy has pointed out, even if prices are depressed because of
overproduction, the anticipation of future returns might well be
sufficient to induce nations to establish claims and operate them
even though present returns were unsatisfactory.' 4 While it is not
difficult to develop institutions to prevent a race to acquire claims on
the ocean bottom, this does little to control overcapitalization of
13. D. Brooks, supra note 2, at 103-07. Specifically, the estimate was that a single ship
recovering 2,000 to 5,000 tons per day of nodules containing 35% manganese, 0.5% cobalt,
and 2%' each of nickel and copper (a relatively rich nodule but one that might be
representative of the first type mined) would force manganese prices down to about
2Y€ per pound, cobalt to $1.00 per pound, and nickel to 650 per pound. These estimates
were based on the price-consumption relationships as they existed about 1964. They
resulted in a one-third reduction in annual gross revenue.
14. F. Christy, Alternative Regimes for the Minerals of the Sea Floor (to
be published), Proceedings of the American Bar Assn. National Institute on Marine
Resources, June 8, 1967.
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and overproduction from the claims that are acquired. This difficulty almost inheres in the nature of the resource.
Competition Among Deep Sea Mining Firms
Turning now to the broader economic conditions that will develop
if deep sea mining proves successful, we can identify a number of
important corollaries to the points just discussed, corollaries that
relate both to considerations of economic efficiency and to those of
income distribution. Largely because of the high investment cost
and large scale, we can assume that the number of mining operations
will be limited, at least initially. Certainly rapid expansion into deep
sea mining itself, as distinct from simply asserting the right to mine,
is improbable. Moreover, only firms in the most highly developed
nations will have the combination of technical ability and financial
capacity to mount a deep sea mining venture. Even there, joint
ventures to increase capability and reduce risk are to be expected.
Oligopoly, if not monopoly, will be the rule, and the resulting concentration of economic power must raise anew all of the old questions about the balance between gains in the efficiency of production
and losses in the force of competition. It is unclear where the balance
can or should be struck, though it is obvious that it will be far from
that which currently obtains for the fishing industry.
Actually, in terms of the producing firms, all of this will entail
just a continuation of past trends. Most of the metals recoverable
from deep sea manganese nodules are recovered today by a relatively
small number of concerns from the advanced countries: western
world nickel production is dominated by a single firm, and cobalt
and copper production by a dozen or so; manganese production has
also tended to become concentrated over the past twenty years. The
only new factor will be the entry of other than traditional mining
firms into the production of primary metals. 15
If the nationality and structure of producers is not likely to
change radically with the advent of deep sea mining, the nationality
of production may change sharply. With the exception of those
in the Soviet Union, all of the major manganese deposits of the
world occur in the developing nations. From India to Brazil to
Morocco to Gabon, manganese ore provides up to 5 per cent of the
B.

15. As Thomas A. Wilson, among others, has pointed out, the lead into deep sea
mining is being taken by petroleum and chemical firms. See: Undersea Mining: Where
Do We Stand Today?, 166 Engineering and Mining Journal 83 (1965).
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export earnings of developing nations. This may or may not create a
problem. Deep sea mining could develop so slowly that no country
would lose its export markets. Even with rapid expansion into the
oceans, the deposits in certain nations, Gabon for example, are so
rich and so large that they probably would not suffer from the
competition. On the other hand, the deposits in Ghana, Morocco,
and India are more vulnerable; manganese export earnings for
these countries could be cut to zero if sea floor manganese proves
commercially attractive.
Obviously, the exact distribution of gains from deep sea mining
among the nations of the world will depend upon the international
regime finally adopted. Several groups with divergent interests can
be readily identified. Unfortunately, we cannot go further into these
matters without straying beyond my self-imposed limits, though it
is clear that they will have much to do with the political feasibility
of any proposed regime.
However, one other aspect of the economics of deep sea mining
deserves consideration at this time: valuation of the resource. This
becomes a problem only to the extent that the resource is limited.
If a resource is essentially limitless in size, its in-place value drops
to zero because there is no need to compete for it. This is the case
for ocean water used as an industrial input in most locations. It is
not likely to be the case for deep sea manganese nodules. The often
repeated statement that nodules are forming on the ocean floor at
a rate faster than that at which the world is consuming manganese
is not really of much practical importance. We don't mine the ocean
bottom; we mine some small portion of it. Sea floor manganese deposits vary greatly in grade, pounds of nodules per square meter,
depth of overlying water, and bottom conditions. 6 They also vary
in distance from markets and from supply ports, as well as in the
number of days of good weather that can be expected at the surface. In this respect manganese nodules are not so different from
fish. Despite the enormous mass of fish in the ocean, the demand
is for certain species, and they are sought in areas where the cost
of hunting them is relatively low. For manganese, certain nodules
in certain localities will offer the best commercial opportunities, and
competition will develop for these deposits.
16. J. Mero, supra note 8, at 127-241. Also: Strategic Location is Key Factor in Marine Mineral Recovery (an interview with Walter H. Hibbard) in Under Sea Technology
at 47 (January 1967).
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Therefore, as deep sea mining is shown to be first technologically
and then economically feasible, the deposits themselves will come to
have value, or, to be more specific, the rights to mine the deposits
will come to have value. The valuation process will take note of all
the factors suggested above involving quantity, quality, and location.
In fact, if a market for deep sea mining rights were established with
enough buyers and sellers, the value determined for each section of
the ocean bottom would approximate the capitalized value of the
net returns obtainable from exploiting the deposit. The higher the
expected returns and the lower the expected costs of production, the
higher would be the value of the deposit.
Of course, with a new resource the valuation process will be
highly approximate. But the difficulties of estimation should not be
overstated. In contrast with most mineral deposits, manganese
nodules occur as a surficial layer (so far as the ocean bottom is concerned). They are visible to a TV camera, and it may prove simpler
than we now imagine to make the necessary estimates. The uncertainties about mining and processing are likely to be greater than
those about the resource itself.
The valuation process is of critical concern because it has to be
operating correctly for production to be efficient. It is the very lack
of a market for fishing rights that has led to the inefficient use of
inputs by the fishing industry, and the inefficient delivery of outputs
to the consumers. But how can a market be developed for manganese
deposits on the ocean bottom, or alternatively, what mechanism can
we find that will substitute for a market? These are matters to
which we must now turn.
III
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE EFFICIENCY OF
DEEP SEA MINING

Production of manganese from the ocean bottom will involve a
series of operations beginning with exploration and ending with
transportation to processing and consuming plants located onshore.
Whatever regime is designed must accommodate all of these steps,
and must do so in a way that will permit production to be efficient,
distribution of returns to be equitable, and conflicts to be avoided.
It goes without saying that the regime must also be politically ac-
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ceptable to enough nations to insure wide acceptance. A number of
authors have discussed possible regimes in just these terms.' 7 The
suggestions range from a sort of laissez-faire flag nation or ruleof-capture approach through nationalization of the ocean bottom
(perhaps by extension of the continental shelf doctrine) to internationalization under the aegis of the United Nations or some other
international agency.
While it is tempting to slide off into discussion of the enormous
issues posed by the alternative regimes, these comments are restricted
to institutional means for achieving economic efficiency. (By efficiency I mean the relationship between the value of all inputs and
the value of useful outputs, and the attempt to increase the latter
relative to the former.' 8 ) In any event, I have already expressed
my personal preference for an international approach, though
largely on grounds other than those of economic efficiency.' 9
Any regime for deep sea mining must incorporate two fundamental principles. Northcutt Ely has stated the first as follows:
"The petroleum and mining industries, whether operating on dry
land or beneath the sea, require . . . above all

.

.

.

the dis-

coverer's exclusive right to exploit the minerals discovered and
security of tenure while he does

so. ''2 °

Second, the mineral indus-

tries require assurance that no special advantage or disadvantage
will be granted to those mining in any particular environment.
The principle of exclusive rights is so fundamental to efficient
mining that the industry often neglects to elaborate upon it. Apart
from exclusive rights there is no way to insure that the returns from
exploration accrue to the discoverer, hence no way to attract capital
17. Numerous discussions have been held during the past few years on alternative
regimes for the high and for the bed of the sea beyond the continental shelf. Notable
were those at the First Annual Law of the Sea Institute in 1966 and at the American
Bar Assn. National Institute on Marine Resources in 1967. The proceedings of the
former will be published shortly by The Ohio State Univ. Press as The Law of the
Sea. Proceedings of the latter are scheduled for publication later this year. See also F.
Christy and A. Scott, The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (1966) ; and W. Burke,
Ocean Sciences, Technology, and the Future International Law of the Sea (1966).
18. F. Knight, The Economic Organization 8 (1933). Knight's formulation of
efficiency was the ratio of useful output to total input.
19. F. Christy and D. Brooks, Shared Resources of the World Community, New
Dimensions for the United Nations 153-65 (1966). Christy has put forward arguments
to the effect that internationalization would also tend to be more efficient than alternative regimes, supra note 14.
20. N. Ely, The Laws Governing Exploitation of the Minerals Beneath the Sea,
Exploiting the Ocean 337, Transactions of the 2nd Annual Marine Technology Society
Conference, Washington, D.C. 1966.
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to the exploration effort nor any way to prevent the common property dilemma that bedevils fishing. If exclusive rights were not available one company could wait until another had done the needed exploration and then, having avoided these costs, move in on the deposit and operate in the same locale. Ignoring the obvious problem
of conflict, it is easy to visualize problems of congestion with equipment forced to operate at less than optimum levels of productivity
or safety. Moreover, the tendency to mine as fast as possible or to
"high grade" would be aggravated by the need to reap the benefits
of mining before another firm obtained them. But for materials
like manganese deposits that are fixed in position and cannot move
across arbitrary property lines, these problems cannot arise once
exclusive use rights are made available. (It is because they are not
fixed in position that common property rather than exclusive rights
apply to fisheries, and that additional forces, such an unitization,
must be applied to make exclusive rights applicable to fluid minerals
like petroleum and gas.)
The principle that deep sea deposits be treated equally with other
sources of supply is also worthy of elaboration. The point is to avoid
either subsidizing or burdening deep sea mining. Every economic
system strives to conduct its affairs in such a way that its demands
are met at minimum cost. Indeed, one of the advantages of having
a variety of alternative resources is that society can choose that
source that requires the least value of inputs per unit of output.
An accurate choice is possible only if costs reflect the actual social
value of inputs, and this will not be the case if one resource is subsidized by receiving underpriced inputs while another is burdened
with overpriced inputs. Note that this principle implies nothing about
the level of taxes or subsidies; it only says that whatever taxes or
subsidies exist should be applied equally to all sources. Of course, no
system attains this goal, but it is one toward which a regime should
strive.
Beyond the basic requirements of exclusive rights and equal treatment, there are other institutional forces that will affect the efficiency
of a deep sea mining industry with the economic characteristics discussed in the preceding section. We can divide them into three
groups: the direct conditions associated with exclusive exploration
and exploitation rights; the method for dealing with the indirect or
external effects of exploration or exploitation; and the method of
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charging for exclusive rights. Each of these forces will be treated as
if rights to mine deep sea manganese were obtainable under some
lease arangements. This is not only a matter of convenience but also
because it is reasonable to think that wherever ultimate control is
vested, the actual mining concern will end up securing leases from
that body. Most mining and petroleum firms are familiar with leasing arrangements on the public domain in the United States and in
foreign countries. They presumably expect something similar in
deep ocean basins.
In addition, some sort of international agreement is assumed.
There must be some set of international rules of the game that exploiters and non-exploiters alike can look to with assurance. Without rules accepted by most nations, the inevitable result would be
uncertainty, whereas economic efficiency demands as much certainty
as possible.
A.

21

Direct Conditions of Leasing

Assuming some form of lease system is to be set up and that it will
have the respect of most of the world community, how can the
leases be designed so as to promote efficiency? First, the system
could be designed with just exploitation leases or with both exploration and exploitation leases. Under the former system each interested firm would undertake exploration efforts freely and then act
on the basis of this proprietary information in trying to win exclusive exploitation leases. This is the arrangement currently in
effect for offshore oil in the United States. Alternatively, the leasing
body could offer exclusive exploration leases, presumably with the
usual provision that specified fractions of the tract be returned to
public ownership at set intervals, but also with the privilege of converting some fraction to an exploitation lease. This is the arrangement used by many underdeveloped nations. The choice between the
21. A number of the points in this section lean on the presentation by L.
Goldie, Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Need for Future Modifications, The Law of the Sea (to be published). My only significant point of disagreement
with Professor Goldie concerns the possibility of a mining firm operating outside of
the accepted regime, which he would permit at the option-and at the risk-of the firm.
But the goal of reducing uncertainty suggests that whatever international regime obtains for one firm should obtain for all. The problem might be minimal if a few small
concerns elect to operate outside of the international regime. It would seem more likely
that the most powerful firms would exercise this option, in which case the regime could
find itself nearly powerless.
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two will probably depend upon how well
the resource comes to be
22
known before exploitation is imminent.
Second, any lease should be limited in area. The sea floor is a
definable surface so that establishing boundary lines between leases
will give rise to no serious technical difficulties. The size of any one
lease should probably not be fixed but depend upon estimates of the
quantity and quality of the resource available. The minimum size
of the lease would be determined by the room needed for technologically efficient recovery of minerals from the bottom under ideal
circumstances. Less than ideal circumstances would justify a larger
area. Exploration leases, if used, should cover much more area than
exploitation leases.
Third, the lease should be valid only so long as the company needs
it to explore for or exploit the resource in question. On the other
hand, assuming that the lessee does not violate any of its provisions,
a lease should be renewable so long as work continues.
Fourth, a performance requirement should be included. This
establishes some period of time within which exploitation must commence (or within which a specified expenditure must be made for
exploration). Otherwise the lease is cancelled. The object of a performance requirement is to prevent firms from acquiring and indefinitely holding leases for speculative purposes. They are common
to almost all lease or claim systems, and they are effective to the
extent that the time or money required to satisfy them is a real
barrier to "sitting on" a claim. The performance requirement takes
on an added importance with a new resource such as deep sea manganese nodules. The absence of an effective performance requirement would practically invite a race to claim areas of potential
value on the sea floor. Such a race would be inefficient in the extreme.
It would require that capital and manpower be devoted to establishing claims on these resources before they are really needed by the
world community. Total inputs would be greatly in excess of those
needed for orderly development. Performance requirements do have
the disadvantage that they contribute to the tendency toward excessive rates of production, but this is a problem that must be dealt
with by separate techniques.
22. Under a third possible arrangement, the leasing body itself would conduct the
exploration effort and then make the information available to any interested party.
This arrangement would provide a significant economy in exploration expenditures,
and might promote competition by reducing both risk and initial investment. However,
it is unlikely to appeal to mining or petroleum firms and would place enormous burdens
on the leasing agency.
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Finally, some procedure-it matters little which-must be established for dealing with boundary line disputes. Again, efficiency is
easily obtained for stationary resources like manganese nodules. If
some adjustments are necessary, equitable divisions can be worked
out much as the more complex boundary line disputes in petroleum
have been settled.
B.

Indirect Effects of Use
The second of the institutional forces that will influence the
economic efficiency of deep sea mining involves the methods for
dealing with the indirect or external effects resulting from exploration or exploitation. Efficiency is not so obvious a goal as it sometimes seems. For example, the goal of minimizing total cost for each
level of output should refer not just to the cost of the mining firm
itself but also to any costs that the mining activity may impose on
other economic units. Similarly, any benefits conferred by mining
(as, possibly, fish nutrients brought to the surface) should be
counted as part of its output. Such external costs and benefits arise
because of technologic interdependencies among inputs and outputs,
so that one economic unit can force another to operate at higher or
lower levels of efficiency than it would if operating alone. There
are two common sorts of interdependencies that we may distinguish,
though they both reflect the same economic forces. The first involves
multiple demands for the same resource and the second, pollution.
Multiple demands arise when several valuable resources occur
within the same vertical segment from ocean floor to ocean surface.
For example, manganese deposits and preferred routings for submarine cables could lie in the same area, and a busy shipping lane
could lie directly above both. On efficiency grounds we should allow
for that use or combination of uses which will generate the highest
net returns (or, in economic terms, that will maximize rent). A useful way to conceptualize the problem of selecting among multiple
possible uses so as to maximize net economic returns is to ask what
one operating unit would do if it owned all the resources in question.
If multiple use would be inefficient or dangerous, the regime should
be prepared to reallocate use rights on this basis or to permit use
rights to be "bid" from one application to another. It may, for example, be preferable to prohibit mining in certain areas if surface
traffic is very heavy and cannot use an alternative route without
major cost increases; in other areas manganese deposits may be so
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valuable that it will be worth moving submarine cables to get at
them. In many, perhaps most, cases it will be possible to work out
some form of accommodation so that both activities can co-exist.
Of course, there is nothing to force a regime to allocate by returns;
"first-come, first-served" is another rule that could be followed. All
that can be said is that any system other than one based on net returns will reduce economic efficiency below what it could be.
The other common external effect is pollution. This is also a matter of multiple use, the added demand for use of the sea for waste
disposal. However, in contrast to the cases just presented where the
benefits of resource use are shared, pollution is the process by which
costs are shifted from one resource user to another. The technologic
interdependencies associated with pollution are obvious. Waste disposal by one economic unit transmits physical substances to other
units. Pollution may, for example, destroy a fishery or a beach, in
which case the returns to the miner are higher than they should be
and those to the fisherman or the beach user lower than they should
be.
Certainly, exploration and exploitation leases should include
clauses to deal with pollution. Since the shifting of costs resulting
from transmission of pollutants takes place outside the market system, the solution is to re-distribute costs so that the effects of waste
disposal come to bear on the mining firm's account books. One
method for accomplishing this involves establishment of a charge
or tax related to the damages imposed on other economic units by
the pollutants. In effect, this "internalizes" the cost in the same way
that benefits were treated by assuming they all accrued to the same
firm. Mining firms might react to a pollution charge by reducing
waste disposal volume, by changing it to a less noxious form, or by
paying compensation to those injured. Whatever its decision, the
point is that in a strictly private framework the control of pollution
is not economically attractive, but that it becomes so when all costs
in the system are taken into account.
Cutting across both aspects of indirect effects is the problem of
values, for market prices are not always adequate reflections of
social values. We can only note the problem here, for the question
of how to measure values in the ocean is worthy of separate discussion. Clearly, many approximations will be necessary, but difficulties may be mitigated by the absence of large intangible values
on the high seas. Losses in recreational benefits and natural beauty,
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and changes in ecology do not seem likely to be widespread. However, this is just a guess. It could be that deep ocean mining will so
stir up bottom conditions that it will produce quite unexpected tangible and intangible effects. Recent experience with oil spills should,
if nothing else, teach us to be agnostic on such matters.
C.

Chargesfor Exclusive Rights
The final area we must take up is the matter of charges for
exploration and exploitation rights. As before, emphasis will remain with the impact of such charges on the efficiency of production
rather than with the matter of who receives the payment. Actually,
it may not make much difference to the potential miner whether he
makes payments to his own country, to some other country, or to an
international agency. He is almost sure to pay something, even if it is
no more than a nominal fee for protection.
However, the principle of equal treatment of all resources suggests that the leasing authority, whatever it is, charge more than
a nominal sum for exclusive rights. If it does not attempt to extract
fair market value (which admittedly may be very low or even nil
at first), an unfair advantage would accrue to ocean mining firms
compared with firms that must pay for rights to mine similar onshore resources. As a result, capital and labor inputs would tend to
be inefficiently allocated between onshore and offshore areas, as well
as among various offshore areas. If exclusive rights to deep sea resources are too highly priced, exploration and exploitation will be
deterred and other deposits will be used though they are higher cost
sources. If exclusive rights are priced too low, there will be a tendency for excess inputs of capital and labor to move into deep sea
mining in order to reap the returns, thus aggravating the problem
of high rates of production that may result just from the economic
characteristics of the mining operation.
How can the value of exclusive rights to this resource be determined, and how can a mechanism to charge for these rights be set
up? These two questions are inseparable. If we can find an appropriate mechanism for capture revenues, we will at the same time
have found a way for determining their value. There is no one best
solution, but some suggestions seem in order.
First, it would be useful to distinguish between charges to cover
the cost of administering a deep sea regime and charges related to
the market value of exclusive rights. The former is a cost of opera-
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tion that ought to be borne by those who benefit from it. That is,
there will be certain public costs associated with recording leases,
protecting them, and dealing with boundary disputes. These costs
could be expressed in terms of an annual rental per square mile of
ocean bottom, such rental to be fixed for all parties so as to just
cover the public costs. Alternatively, public costs could be covered
by a license fee, a system that would be more appropriate if the
largest share of the costs occur upon establishment of the lease
rather than being distributed over its working life.
Second, the possibility of external effects suggests that a bonding
system be developed. Such a system would require that firms desiring exploration or exploitation leases establish a fund large enough
to pay for external damages. In the event that prescribed pollutioncontrol procedures were violated or that unexpected damages occurred, the fund could be used to reduce the pollution or compensate
those who had suffered from it. If no damage occurred, the bond
would be returned to the firm upon termination of the lease. Bonding arrangements are commonly a part of mining regulation, particularly with surface mining for coal in the eastern part of the
United States. The needed pollution-control measures, the appropriate size of the bond, and the conditions under which it would be
forfeited could only be determined from experience.
Third, and most difficult, a system is needed to establish and collect the market value for exclusive rights. 23 A number of techniques
are possible including various kinds of bidding, appraisal prices,
royalties based on flat or sliding scales, tax systems, etc. Each technique requires that somebody have authority to dispose of exclusive
rights and that it either offer specified portions of the bottom or
permit firms to suggest the areas to be put up for auction. Each also
requires that the criterion for awarding leases be unambiguous so
that no question can arise as to which firm made the best offer. My
suggestion is for a sealed bid auction in which bids are made in the
form of a gross production tax or royalty.
Sealed bidding is strongly recommended because under the competitive conditions to be expected with deep sea mining, it is more
likely than open (oral) bidding to yield true market values. The
number of bidders is apt to be small, but based on his studies of
sealed bids by oil and gas firms operating on the continental shelf of
23. Many of the suggestions in the following paragraphs are based on a fine article
by W. Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy-Oral Auction vs. Sealed Bids, 7
Natural Resources Journal 194-224 (1967).
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the United States, Walter Mead reports that "even where . . . a
lack of bidder interest, rather than collusion, results in one-bidder
sales under sealed bid procedures, such sales may yield a price close
to a competitive price, . . .- 24
Mead also suggested that the structure of the industry should be
considered when selecting a bidding practice. Sealed bids are generally more appropriate for conditions where large capital investments are necessary and consequently where bidding is apt to be
oligopsonistic. This conclusion is reinforced for industries that have
alternative sources of raw material, that operate on the basis of
long-lived leases, and that expend relatively large sums in exploration efforts. 2 These characteristics practically describe deep sea
mining. Thus, there is every reason to think that the sealed bid
auction is appropriate.
Mead also suggests that a refusal price that "realistically reflects
competitive prices becomes more important as the structure of the
buyer industry becomes more concentrated (oligopsonistic).' 26
However, as he also points out, for some resources it is very difficult to establish realistic refusal prices. This is certainly going to be
the case for deep sea mining, at least for some time to come. If at
some point it becomes possible to rapidly survey deep sea manganese deposits and estimate production costs, minimum acceptable
prices may become appropriate. For the time being, the minimum
acceptable price should simply be the rental charge noted above to
cover direct public costs.
The uncertainty surrounding the value of the resource also leads
to the suggestion that a yield tax or royalty system rather than a
bonus payment system be utilized. A bonus must be paid upon securing the lease and regardless of whether the venture turns out to be
profitable or even possible. With a new resource of uncertain value,
there is reason to avoid introducing added initial costs. It is preferable to wait until production has actually begun and at that point
tax output. The absence of a bonus may also induce a larger number
of bids because the investment, hence the risk, is not increased by an
initial payment.
Yield taxes can be designed either as a profit sharing (net income)
tax or as a royalty (gross production) tax. Economic theory lends
support to the former because it does not affect the costs or the
24. Id. at 213.
25. Id. at 219-23.
26. Id. at 223.
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rate of production. If there are no profits, no tax need be paid. However, there are also some disadvantages. Net income is often difficult to determine, particularly for a single operation of a complex
organization, and the problems of international policing appear unmanageable. In contrast, unless production can be hidden, which is
not likely to be the case for ocean mining, gross production is so
apparent and the tax so easy to estimate that there could be little
question of whether the correct amount was being paid. The royalty
bid would vary from firm to firm because of different situations and
expectations. At least initially, when lack of competition would keep
the bid low, the effect on cost of production should prove minimal.
Whatever economic losses occur might well be counterbalanced by
the gain in convenience and economy for both operating firms and
collecting agency.
CONCLUSION

The initial section of this paper developed the idea that manganese is a resource in the sense that it is beginning to have an impact on both public and private decisions about future sources of
supply. While it may not be economic to mine the nodules at present,
analysis of alternative manganese resources indicates that they are
close enough to the margin to place a ceiling on the long-run prices
of manganese, nickel, and cobalt. In the second section, it was concluded that deep sea mining will be a highly intensive capital venture, that large capacity and high rates of production will be the
rule, and that only a relatively few firms and nations will be able to
participate directly in it. It was also concluded that competition for
the best deposits of manganese nodules is almost certain to develop
once deep sea mining proves feasible so that the rights to mine these
deposits will acquire value.
The final section of the paper began with the premise that any
institutional regime would have to take account of these economic
characteristics. Hence, it focused on the ways in which institutional
forces could be designed so as to promote economic efficiency in deep
sea mining. The usefulness of a market to establish the value of
exclusive mining rights was emphasized as a technique that could
go far towards this goal. Among other things, it was suggested that
such a market might best be organized around a lease system with
closed bids offered in terms of royalty payment.
However, except perhaps for some form of exclusive rights dur-
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ing mining, none of the forces discussed in the third section is absolute in the sense that it must be present for mining to take place.
On the one hand, leases could be given away at no charge; pollution
could be ignored; performance requirements need not be enforced.
A nation might decide, for example, that national security requires
better knowledge of the oceans and that subsidizing deep sea mining is one way to obtain it. The point is not that such a decision
would be invalid, but that economic efficiency would thereby be reduced below what it otherwise could be. On the other hand, my
suggestions have been made on the basis of certain assumptions and
projections. If these turn out to be wrong, the suggestions may be
inappropriate. Even if they turn out to be correct, alternative institutional forces might be designed that would be preferable in
terms of economic efficiency. Additional suggestions are all to the
good; each of these matters requires further attention. The purpose of this paper is not to establish definitive criteria, but rather
to extend discussion.

